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Abstract
Background: In 2003, the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) was introduced in China to re-establish health
insurance for the country’s vast rural population. In addition, the coverage of NCMS has been expanding after the
new health care reform launched in 2009. This study aims to examine whether the NCMS and its recent expansion
have reached the goal of reducing the risk and inequality of catastrophic health spending for rural residents in China.
Methods: We conducted a face-to-face household survey in three counties of the Shandong province in 2009 and
2012. Using this unique panel data, we examined the changes in the incidence and intensity of catastrophic health
expenditures (CHEs) before and after NCMS reimbursement. We used concentration index (CI) and decomposition
method to study the changes in inequality in CHEs.
Results: We found that NCMS reimbursement played a role of reducing both the incidence and intensity of CHEs, and
that this impact was stronger after the new health care reform was launched. After reimbursement, the concentration
indices for CHEs were 0.073 and 0.021 in 2009 and 2012, indicating that the rich had a greater tendency to incur CHEs
and there existed less inequality in the incidence of CHEs after reimbursement in 2012 compared with 2009.
The decomposition analysis results suggested that changes in CHE inequality between 2009 and 2012 were
attributed to changes in economic status and household size rather than reimbursement levels.
Conclusions: Our results indicated that inequality was shrinking from 2009 to 2012, which could be a result
of fewer rich people having CHEs in 2012 compared with 2009. The impact of NCMS in alleviating the financial burden of
rural residents was still limited, especially among the poor. Health care reform policies in China that aim to reduce CHEs
must continue to place an emphasis on improving reimbursement, cost containment, and reducing income inequalities.
Keywords: New cooperative medical scheme, Inequality, Catastrophic health expenditures, Concentration index
Background
Catastrophic health expenditures (CHEs) can induce
households into poverty and is a major concern in many
countries [1–3]. CHEs refer to high levels of healthcare
expenditures that affect a household’s standard of living
by causing the household to sacrifice other basic expen-
ditures to pay for health costs [4]. CHEs can be defined
as health payments that exceed a fixed threshold share
of household income or total expenditures in a given
period, usually one year [5]. Some studies define CHEs
as total health expenditures that exceed 10 % of total an-
nual household income [3, 6], and others operate with a
limit of 40 % when capacity to pay (CTP) is used as the
denominator [7–11].
Health insurance is implemented as a measure to pro-
tect households against CHEs and to improve access to
medical care. For example, results from a 2008 study
showed that a universal coverage policy that was intro-
duced in Thailand contributed to preventing financial
catastrophe and impoverishment due to reduced out-of-
pocket health care payments [12]. A 2007 study from
India indicated that community health insurance ap-
peared to be effective in protecting members against
CHEs among hospitalised patients [6]. Wagstaff et al.
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analysed three surveys and suggested that previous
health insurance reforms in China led to increases in
out-of-pocket spending and the risk of large, cata-
strophic expenses [1]. The existing literature suggests
that the effect of health insurance on preventing CHE is
partial or limited. In countries where out-of pocket ex-
penditures are the most important source of health care
financing, their effects on household economic status
can be severe, particularly among the poor.
Prior to 1978, the majority of the rural population in
China was covered by the Cooperative Medical Scheme
(CMS), a collective-economy, prepaid health security
program. However, under the Chinese economic reform
that began in 1978, the CMS collapsed, leaving the vast
majority of the rural population with no insurance
coverage. Since the Chinese economic reform, medical
expenditures have been a major financial burden for
many rural households in China [13–15]; and access to
and utilisation of health care in rural areas was governed
by the ability to pay. Recognising the magnitude of this
issue, the Chinese government initiated the New Coopera-
tive Medical System (NCMS) in 2003 to re-establish
health insurance system for the rural population. It was
advocated for, organised, and sponsored by the govern-
ment, with rural residents’ voluntary enrolment. One of
its explicit goals is to effectively reduce rural people’s fi-
nancial burden for health services and to relieve impover-
ishment by preventing catastrophic health expenditures
(CHEs). The research findings on whether the NCMS
achieved the objective in reducing CHEs are mixed. Some
studies suggested that NCMS reimbursement helped re-
lieve CHEs to a certain degree, promoted equity in health
financing [3, 16], and played a certain role in reducing out
of pocket health expenditures [17]. Other studies found
that although the NCMS coverage rate is high, the impact
is limited. For instance, Lei et al. found that out-of-pocket
expenditures did not decrease [18]. Wagstaff et al. found
that the NCMS increased utilisation of outpatient and in-
patient services, but had not reduced the incidence of
catastrophic out-of-pocket payments [19]. In 2010, Zhang
et al. analysed data for 2004 and 2007 and found that the
current NCMS program did not appear likely to reduce
the incidence of CHEs [20]. Because of the variations in
research periods and districts, there still is not sufficient
and clear evidence to confirm the effects of the NCMS on
alleviating catastrophic health expenditures in China [21].
To provide the population with convenient and afford-
able health care services, reduce the burden of medical
costs, and relieve the problem of “difficult and costly ac-
cess to health care services”, the Chinese government
implemented the new Health Care Reform in 2009, with
the first step in effect from 2009 to 2011. Under this re-
form, expanding NCMS coverage and improving the
level of reimbursement was one of the most important
policies. As a result, the coverage rate of NCMS reached
over 97 %, and the annual benefit went to 1.315 billion
people in 2011. From 2008 to 2011, financial subsidies at
all levels for NCMS have improved from 120 yuan
(about 18.80 USD) to 200 yuan (about 31.34 USD) per
person per year [22]. However, there is still insufficient
evidence of whether the increase in government contri-
bution and expansion of NCMS coverage has reduced fi-
nancial burden [23, 24].
Therefore, in 2007, we conducted a face-to-face house-
hold survey of rural residents in three counties in the
Shandong province, where the NCMS was piloted. Some
of the households in the original survey were inter-
viewed again in follow-up surveys first in 2009 and then
in 2012. Using this unique panel data collected from the
same households before and after the new Health Care
Reform, our study aims to fill the gap by contributing to
the evidence of the effects of the NCMS after the imple-
mentation of the new Health Care Reform. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study to utilise panel
data to analyse the impacts of the NCMS on CHEs be-
fore and after the new Health Care Reform.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains
data and descriptive statistics; Section 3 explains the
methods used in the analyses; Section 4 presents results;
Section 5 offers a discussion of the study’s results; and
Section 6 presents a brief conclusion.
Data and description
Sampling method and sample selection
We conducted a field investigation on the NCMS in the
Shandong province that entailed a face-to-face survey,
originally in 2007 and then in 2009 and 2012.
Three stratifications from the counties that imple-
mented the NCMS in Jinan, Shandong, were chosen
based on per capita net family income of the rural area
into high, middle, and low using a stratified random
sampling method. Then, one county was chosen from
each stratification. As a result, three counties in Jinan
City were included in the survey: Zhangqiu, Changqing,
and Pingyin. These three counties are representative of
the initial pilot counties in Shandong province in 2005
in the following ways: Zhangqiu is a high-income county
with per capita net family income of rural area 11,965.3
yuan (about 1,875.44 USD); Changqing is a middle-
income county with per capita net family income of
rural area 10,079.1 yuan (about 1,579.80 USD); and Pin-
gyin is a low-income county with per capita net family
income of rural area 8,490.0 yuan (about 1,330.72 USD).
In the 2007 household survey, six towns were ran-
domly selected in accordance with high, middle, and low
incomes as measured by per capita net family income of
the rural area in each selected county. Then, six villages
were randomly selected as high, middle, and low
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incomes in each selected town. Finally, 30 households in
each village were chosen using an equal distance sam-
pling method and the village household registration lists;
all household members were interviewed. However, the
household head answered the questions in the absence
of any members who were not home. This generated a
sample of 3,240 households and 11,543 individuals.
In the 2009 household survey, due to a sudden budget
cut, only three towns were surveyed among the six in
each county that were included in the 2007 survey. The
choice of the three towns was based on high, middle,
and low incomes. The three towns selected were among
the villages from 2007 survey were kept. Finally, 20
households were randomly selected from 30 households
in each village that were included in the 2007 survey.
The final sample comprised 985 households and 3,698
individuals.
In 2012, the same towns, villages, and households in
the original 2007 survey were surveyed again. If a rele-
vant household member was not home, the home was
eliminated rather than our choosing another household.
This resulted in a total of 2,174 households that com-
prised 8,110 individuals in our 2012 survey.
In this study, we only use the 2009 and 2012 surveys
to compare the impacts of the NCMS on catastrophic
health expenditures before and after reform. There are
two reasons for not using the original 2007 survey data:
first, the health care reform was implemented in 2009,
and second, the quality of the 2007 data was not consid-
ered sufficient because the hospital expenses were cited
by personal recall rather than based on receipts and the
data was not reconfirmed by using the NCMS informa-
tion system at each county. Because the NCMS coverage
in these two years was very high, we kept only the
NCMS enrolees. The valid sample size for this study was
3,534 and 7,707 individuals in the 2009 and 2012 waves,
respectively. For this study, we used only the unbalanced
panel data based on the year 2009. That is, the sample
included all of the individuals in 2009 (3,534 individuals
in 971 households) and the same individuals who were
surveyed again in 2012 (2358 individuals in 694 house-
holds). Individuals in developing countries generally do
not visit a health care provider unless they perceive
themselves as either ill or injured. If there are unob-
served factors correlated with the perception of illness
and the likelihood of visiting a provider, then the coeffi-
cients in the equation will be biased. The biases can,
therefore, be referred to as unobserved heterogeneity
biases. As a result, we used panel data to analyse the
hospital utilisation of households to account for unob-
served heterogeneity at the household level and to be
better able to capture the specific nature of the
dependent variables. Descriptive statistics for the sample
are shown in Table 2. However, when we measured the
effects of the NCMS on the catastrophic health expendi-
tures induced by hospitalisation, we only kept the house-
holds that had experienced hospitalisation in the year
(2009 and 2012). After omitting the households with in-
complete information, specifically, the lack of important
data, such as expenditures, 131 and 108 households in
2009 and 2012, respectively, remained for further ana-
lysis of CHEs.
The survey was conducted by students at Shandong
University. Before the survey all interviewers were
trained by the principal investigator who designed this
survey, and all interviewers practiced interviewing. Dur-
ing the survey, the interviewers conducted the house-
hold survey and face-to-face interviews with the
individuals who agreed to participate. We also had two
coordinators for each village who were familiar with the
status of the fields to improve the response rate, and one
supervisor who controlled the survey quality. The com-
pleteness of the questionnaires was checked by the
supervisor of each village at the end of every day. If there
was missing information on the survey, individuals
would be telephoned and re-surveyed if possible. Ethical
approval is not required for conducting this type of
health services survey in China. However, our inter-
viewers were instructed to obtain consent from all in-
dividuals when conducting the household survey and
face-to-face interviews. The individuals were informed
about their right to refuse to answer any question.
The NCMS in sample districts
The development of the NCMS in the Shandong prov-
ince follows the same trend as that across China. In gen-
eral, in the Shandong province, all levels of government
subsidised no less than 60 yuan (about 9.40 USD) and
200 yuan (about 31.34 USD) for the NCMS in 2009 and
2012, respectively. In the sample districts, in 2009, the
total contribution to the NCMS was 70 yuan (about
10.97 USD) in Zhangqiu and Changqing counties. The
central and local governments at all levels subsidised 60
yuan (about 9.40 USD) per farmer, and the farmer paid
the remaining 10 yuan (about 1.57 USD) annually to
enrol in the NCMS. In Pingyin County, the total contri-
bution to the NCMS was 40 yuan (about 6.27 USD).
The total subsidy from all levels of government was 30
yuan (about 4.70 USD) per farmer, with the farmer pay-
ing the remaining 10 yuan (about 1.57 USD) annually to
enrol in the NCMS. In 2012, the total contributions
were 250 yuan (about 39.18 USD) in each of these three
counties. The government at all levels subsidised 200
yuan (about 31.34 USD) per farmer, with the farmer pay-
ing 50 yuan (about 7.84 USD) annually. The level of re-
imbursement largely increased in 2012 compared with
2009. The reimbursement rate for hospital costs also
largely increased at all hospital levels in 2012. The
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lower-level hospitals had higher reimbursement rates than
the higher-level hospitals in both years. The ceiling on the
amount of annual reimbursement also increased in these
three counties in 2012 compared with 2009 (Table 1).
Descriptive statistics
Information collected in the survey included sex, age, edu-
cation level, occupation, health insurance, and health sta-
tus, household income and expenditures, household size,
health service utilisation (inpatient care with the recall
period of one year for payments preceding the survey) and
medical expenses. Sample descriptive statistics for the key
variables for both 2009 and 2012 are provided in Table 2.
The economic status was divided into five equal intervals
based on household per capita expenditures. Age was di-
vided into two groups (plus the reference group), house-
hold members 65 or over and members age 5 or under
because the inpatient rates for these two groups are rela-
tively high according to other studies [25–27]. The sex of
the household head as identified by the household register
used female as the reference; the education levels were less
than primary school, junior middle school, and senior
middle school, and above; occupation was farmer or non-
farmer; household size was separated into two groups, 1
to 3 members and 4 members or more; the three self-
assessed health status options were worse than normal
(reference), normal, and better than normal.
Methods
Definition of CHEs
In this study, we use 40 % of a household’s capacity to
pay as the threshold for determining CHEs. More
specifically, a household was defined as incurring CHEs
if annual hospital expenditures are equal to or higher
than 40 % of its capacity to pay (CTP). CTP is usually
defined as pre-payment income minus basic necessity
expenditure [2]. In a developing country context, given
the lack of organised labour markets and the high vari-
ability of incomes over time, household consumption, or
even expenditure, is generally considered to be a better
measure of welfare and CTP, than is income [28]. In our
study, we use total household expenditures to measure
pre-payment income and food expenditures as a proxy
for necessities [2, 3]. In our sensitivity analysis, we also
tested CHEs as defined using other thresholds, 20 %,
30 %, 50 %, and 60 % of CTP [13].
Inpatient care is usually costly, and the majority of
NCMS enrolees who incurred CHEs did so as a result of
hospitalisation [3]. In this study, we included non-medical
direct expenses related to seeking care, such as transport,
accommodation, food, caregiving, and so on. We calcu-
lated these expenses during the lengths of stay and used
income lost because of loss of working time as the caregiv-
ing expense. The out-of-pocket (OOP) payment after in-
surance was calculated by subtracting the total hospital
expenditure from the amount that was reimbursed. CHEs
were calculated by the OOP payment and non-medical
direct expenses as a proportion of CTP.
Incidence and intensity of “catastrophic” payments
We use three indices to measure CHEs under the
NCMS: catastrophic payment headcount, mean cata-
strophic payment gap, and mean positive payment gap.
Catastrophic payment headcount is defined here as the
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for NCMS policies and coverage in 2009 and 2012
2009 2012




0 (0 USD) 0 (0 USD) 0 (0 USD) 300 (47.01 USD) 200 (31.34 USD) 200 (31.34 USD)
County-level
hospital
1,000 (156.7 USD) 0 (0 USD) 0 (0 USD) 400 (62.68 USD) 400 (62.68 USD) 400 (62.68 USD)




30 55 40 70 80 70
County-level
hospital
25 22.5 40 55 45 55
Above county
hospital
15 10 40 40 35 40
NCMS participation N (%)
NCMS enrolees 3,558 (96.21) 7,881 (97.18)
Non-enrolees 140 (3.79) 229 (2.82)
Note: The reimbursement rate was calculated based on expenditures under 10,000 yuan (about 156.7 USD) based on NCMS policies
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proportion of households with health expenditures that
exceeded the threshold; it reflects the incidence of
CHEs. The mean catastrophic payment gap is defined
here as the average degree by which payments exceed
the threshold; it measures both incidence and intensity
of the CHEs. The mean positive payment gap is defined
here as payments in excess of the threshold in house-
holds that exceed the threshold [1]; It measures the in-
tensity of the CHEs. The formulas are as follows:
We define T as health expenditures and X as the
ability to pay, which equals total minus food expendi-
tures. Then, T/X represents the proportion of health
expenditures. Let household catastrophic overshoot Oi
equal Ti/Xi minus the threshold if it is positive and
zero otherwise. Define an indicator E = 1 if Oi > 0 and
zero otherwise. Then, the catastrophic payment head-






where N is the sample size (the total number of
households).






And the mean positive payment gap is calculated as:
MPGcat ¼ Gcat=Hcat
Inequality between poor and non-poor households
The Concentration Index (CI) is a common index for
measuring inequality in health service [29–32]. The CI is
defined as twice the area between the concentration
curve and the line of equality (the 45-degree line). In
this article, we use CI to judge whether poor households
incurred more CHEs than did non-poor households.
The CI formula is as follows:
C ¼ 2
μ
cov h; rð Þ
in which r is the rank of socioeconomic status, h is
whether the household had incurred CHEs, μ is the
mean CHE in the sample, and cov is the weighted
covariance.
Socioeconomic status was determined by households’
per capita expenditures. We define CE as the concentra-
tion index of catastrophic payment headcount and CO as
the CI of the catastrophic overshoot across income. The
value of the concentration index can vary between −1
and +1. A positive value of CE means a greater tendency
for the rich to exceed the threshold, whereas a negative
value indicates a greater tendency for the poor to do so.
Similarly, a positive CO indicates that excess payments
are more likely to be concentrated among the rich
households, whereas a negative value shows that the
overshoots are more likely to be concentrated among
the poor households. When there is no inequality, the
concentration index will be zero.
Decomposing CHE inequalities
We also follow the method proposed by Wagstaff et al.
and Hosseinpoor et al. to decompose CI into its deter-
minant variables to explain how they contribute to
inequality [33, 34]. According to the decomposition, we
calculate the CI of each variable, as well as the percent-
age of CHE contribution to the concentration index. In
our analysis, CHEs are measured as a binary variable, ei-
ther one or zero, depending on whether the proportion
of hospitalisation expenditures exceeded the threshold of
40 %. We used the natural logarithm of the CHE odds
rather than the observed CHE. A positive CHE contribu-
tion to socioeconomic inequality meant that the distribu-
tion of explanatory variable by economic status increased
socioeconomic inequality (or vice versa) [35]. The formula
can be written as:
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for study variables in 2009 and
2012
Variables 2009 2012
N (%) N (%)
Economic status (reference group = Quintile1)
Quintile2 194 (19.98) 139 (20.03)
Quintile3 194 (19.98) 138 (19.88)
Quintile4 194 (19.98) 139 (20.03)
Quintile5 194 (19.98) 139 (20.03)
Household member≥ 65 256 (26.36) 223 (32.13)
Household member≤ 5 194 (19.98) 96 (13.83)
Household head
Sex (male) 890 (91.66) 641 (92.36)
Education (reference group = below primary school level)
Junior middle school 406 (41.81) 279 (40.20)
Senior middle school and above 99 (10.20) 65 (9.37)
Occupation (farmer) 826 (85.07) 600 (86.46)
Household size (reference group = 1–3 members)
≥ 4 members 525 (54.07) 382 (55.04)
Chronic disease 588 (60.56) 352 (50.72)
Self-assessed health (reference group = worse)
Normal 261 (26.88) 168 (24.21)
Better 493 (50.77) 413 (59.51)
Total 971 694









Where βk, xk , and Ck are the coefficient, mean, and
concentration index of Xk, respectively,
βkxk
μ is the elasti-
city of h with respect to Xk which is the measurement of





Ck is the contribution to CI.
Decomposing changes in CHE inequalities
We use Oaxaca-type decomposition to determine how
much changes in inequality were attributable to changes
in inequalities in the determinants [33, 34, 36]. We de-
note by ηkt the elasticity of h with respect to Xk at time










This decomposition allowed us to assess the extent to
which changes in CHE inequalities were due to changes
in inequality in the determinants rather than changes in
elasticity.
Results
Determinants of hospitalisation of households
It was important to study how the probability of being
hospitalised developed between those two years when we
adjusted for other variables that influence the probability
of being hospitalised. It was found that the proportions of
households that experienced a hospitalisation in 2009 and
2012 are 13.49 % and 15.56 %, respectively. Thus, a more
detailed analysis was conducted of the household-level
random effects (to account for unobserved heterogeneity
at the household level) using a logit model to analyse the
determinants of household hospitalisation. Some variables
exist that are not changed over time including sex, occu-
pation, and others. Thus, the random effect terms were
analysed as those variables may influence the hospitalisa-
tion [37, 38].
The results of random-effect logit model were shown
in Table 3. The year dummy variable shows an increase
in the rate of hospitalisations in 2012 compared with
2009. The results also show that hospitalisation was
more likely to occur in the higher socioeconomic quin-
tiles. Having a family member aged 5 or younger and
having a male as the household head increased the prob-
ability of hospitalisation. Household size equal to or
greater than 4 members and members with a chronic
disease also increased the probability of hospitalisation.
The better the self-assessed health of the household
member who reported the poorest health, the lower the
probability of hospitalisation.
CHE and its inequality according to economic status
The incidence and intensity of CHEs are shown on
Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6. Comparing the two
years, after reimbursement, the incidence and the in-
tensity was lower in 2012. The impact of the NCMS
on reducing CHEs was shown to be much higher in
2012 compared to 2009.
Table 7 shows higher inequality after reimbursement
compared with before. After reimbursement, the rich
had a greater tendency to incur CHEs and there existed
less inequality in the incidence of CHEs after reimburse-
ment in 2012 compared with 2009. Regarding the inten-
sity of CHEs, the overshoot tended to be greater among
Table 3 Determinants of household hospitalisations
Coefficient Std.Err p
Economic status (reference group = Quintile1)
Quintile2 0.288 0.298 0.333
Quintile3 0.725 0.292 0.013
Quintile4 1.326 0.295 0.000
Quintile5 1.879 0.303 0.000
Household member≥ 65 0.175 0.193 0.365
Household member≤ 5 0.700 0.223 0.002
Household head
Sex (male) 0.782 0.350 0.026
Education (reference group = below primary school level)
Junior middle school −0.262 0.189 0.166
Senior middle school and above −0.337 0.325 0.299
Occupation (farmer) 0.290 0.268 0.279
Household size (reference group = 1–3 members)
≥ 4 members 0.444 0.189 0.019
Chronic disease 0.577 0.215 0.007
Self-assessed health (reference group = worse)
Normal −0.484 0.213 0.023
Better −1.091 0.236 0.000
year (2012) 0.118 0.054 0.029
Table 4 Headcount of catastrophic health expenditures (CHEs)







Reduction by the NCMS
(a–b)/a (%)
2009 2012 2009 2012 2009 2012
20 % 61.83 74.07 54.96 52.78 11.11 28.74
30 % 45.80 62.04 42.75 39.81 6.66 35.83
40 % 31.30 46.30 26.72 26.85 14.63 42.01
50 % 22.14 28.70 19.85 14.81 10.34 48.40
60 % 16.79 22.22 12.21 8.33 27.28 62.51
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the more wealthy households in 2009, but it tended to
be greater among the poor in 2012.
Decomposition of socioeconomic inequality in
catastrophic health care expenditures
Table 8 shows how the socioeconomic inequality in
CHEs can be explained through decomposition of the
concentration index in the 2009 and 2012 at the thresh-
old of 40 %. The CIs of the variables having household
members older than 65 years or younger than 5 years of
age, larger household size and higher reimbursement are
negative in both years, which means these variables were
concentrated among people with lower economic status.
In contrast, stays at institutions above the county level
or for longer than 15 days had a positive concentration
index in both years, indicating higher use of these ser-
vices among the rich.
The column for contribution to CI shows the absolute
contribution of each determinant variable to socioeco-
nomic inequality. The results show that the contribu-
tions of household size and hospitalisation-related
variables, such as real reimbursement, length of stay,
and inpatient institutions were positive, which means
these variables increased inequality in terms of higher
CHEs among the rich. Economic status had a negative
value. Other variables had small contributions to the in-
equality in both years.
Decomposing changes in CHE inequalities between 2009
and 2012
Our results indicate that from 2009 to 2012, inequality in
CHEs after reimbursement decreased by 0.052. We then
decompose this reduction in CHE inequality to seek con-
tributing factors. It can be observed from Table 9 that the
changes in inequality were not attribute to the changes in
the variables, especially real reimbursement percentage,
and choosing an institution above the county level be-
cause their contributions were negative. It is important to
note that the changes of reimbursement percentage were
mainly due to changes in elasticity rather than inequality.
However, the contribution to the inequality in the CHE
variables, in particular economic status and household
size, tended to be positive, indicating that the poor were
more likely to incur CHEs than were the rich after reim-
bursement from 2009 to 2012.
Discussion
Using an individual-level survey that was conducted in
Shandong province in 2009 and 2012, this study compared
the CHEs incurred from hospitalisation before and after
NCMS reimbursement in rural areas of China. The focus
was to analyse the impact of the NCMS on reducing the
financial burden for rural residents. The research also
used a concentration index and decomposition to analyse
socioeconomic inequality in CHEs.
We checked the change in rate of hospitalisation in
2012 compared with 2009. After we adjusted for potential
contributing factors, a positive time trend was found in
the rate of hospitalisation. Hospitalisation was more likely
to occur in the higher economic status quintiles and
among individuals with a chronic disease. The reason
could be that the payment capacity was higher within this
the higher income group, and that these individuals and
those who suffered from a chronic disease also had greater
health service demands; the individuals who were ≤5 years
old were the high-risk group, with higher disease inci-
dence [26], and larger household size may also have been
related to a higher probability of suffering disease. This
study also found that the households with a male head in-
creased the probability of hospitalisation. This can be
Table 5 Mean catastrophic payment gap in catastrophic health











2009 2012 2009 2012 2009 2012
20 % 17.62 22.42 13.79 12.49 3.83 9.93
30 % 12.43 15.78 9.06 7.90 3.37 7.88
40 % 8.33 10.52 5.82 4.47 2.51 6.05
50 % 5.69 6.89 3.52 2.39 2.17 4.50
60 % 3.71 4.35 1.91 1.18 1.80 3.17
Table 6 Mean positive payment gap in catastrophic health expenditures (CHEs) before and after reimbursement in 2009 and 2012
Threshold Before reimbursement (A) (%) After reimbursement (B) (%) Reduction by NCMS A–B
2009 2012 2009 2012 2009 2012
20 % 28.50 30.27 25.09 23.66 3.41 6.60
30 % 27.14 25.44 21.19 19.84 5.95 5.59
40 % 26.61 22.72 21.78 16.65 4.83 6.07
50 % 25.70 24.01 17.73 16.14 7.97 7.87
60 % 22.10 19.58 15.64 14.17 6.45 5.41
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explained by the fact that the male head of a household is
usually more likely to be able to provide better economic
circumstances for a family, by being the main labour force
of the family and the provider of the main source of in-
come [39]. Better self-assessed health status lowered the
probability of hospitalisation, because of the lower de-
mand of health service. These results were consistent with
those from other studies [25, 40].
Importantly, we found that NCMS reimbursement re-
duced both the incidence and intensity of CHEs, and
this impact was stronger in 2012 compared with 2009.
This is likely related to the health care reform that was
implemented in 2009, which contained a number of pol-
icies to strengthen government financial support to the
NCMS and to expand its coverage. However, in spite of
these improvements, the occurrence of CHEs remained
high in our sample, indicating that the impact of the
NCMS on alleviating the financial burden of rural resi-
dents was still limited. A previous study also found that
the NCMS reimbursement comprised the bulk of the
health expenditures and that the impact on the house-
hold of CHEs was limited [16].
In both 2009 and 2012, the rich had a greater tendency
to incur CHEs than did the poor after reimbursement,
and more rich people incurred CHEs after reimburse-
ment compared with before. Another previous study
that estimated the impact of the NCMS on CHEs also
demonstrated this point [41]. A possible explanation of
this result is that the rich were more likely to stay in
hospital for longer than two weeks. In addition, the rich
had a greater tendency to choose county-level institu-
tions; and according to the NCMS policy, the higher the
Table 7 Concentration Index (CI) for weighted headcount and
gap at the 40 % threshold in 2009 and 2012
Year Before reimbursement After reimbursement
2009 2012 2009 2012
CE 0.031 −0.011 0.073 0.021
CO 0.075 −0.028 0.130 −0.203
Table 8 Decomposition analysis of concentration index of catastrophic health care expenditure in 2009 and 2012
Coefficient Mean Elasticity Concentration index (CI) Contribution to CI
2009 2012 2009 2012 2009 2012 2009 2012 2009 2012
Economic status (reference group = Quintile1)
Quintile2 −0.089 −0.068 0.198 0.194 −0.066 −0.049 −0.392 −0.402 0.026 0.020
Quintile3 −0.094 −0.162 0.198 0.204 −0.070 −0.123 0.008 0.000 −0.001 0.000
Quintile4 −0.103 −0.165 0.198 0.194 −0.077 −0.12 0.408 0.402 −0.031 −0.048
Quintile5 −0.071 −0.119 0.198 0.204 −0.053 −0.090 0.808 0.804 −0.043 −0.073
Household member≥ 65 0.274* −0.009 0.359 0.370 0.368 −0.012 −0.067 −0.037 −0.025 0.000
Household member≤ 5 0.172 0.010 0.244 0.222 0.157 0.008 −0.259 −0.192 −0.041 −0.002
Household head
Sex (male) −0.040 −0.107 0.947 0.935 −0.141 −0.373 −0.026 −0.025 0.004 0.009
Education level (reference group = below primary school level)
Junior middle school 0.152 −0.031 0.382 0.352 0.217 −0.040 −0.042 0.025 −0.009 −0.001
Senior middle school and above −0.049 −0.059 0.076 0.074 −0.014 −0.016 0.398 −0.112 −0.006 0.002
Occupation (farmer) −0.148 0.033 0.863 0.926 −0.478 0.115 0.006 0.001 −0.003 0.000
Household size (reference group = 1–3 members)
≥ 4 members −0.348** −0.145 0.580 0.676 −0.756 −0.366 −0.115 −0.092 0.087 0.034
Real reimbursement −0.067 −0.857** 0.179 0.331 −0.045 −1.055 −0.025 −0.028 0.001 0.030
Length of stay (reference group = fewer than 8 days)
8–14 days −0.003 −0.050 0.267 0.287 −0.003 −0.053 0.070 −0.238 0.000 0.013
≥ 15 days 0.471** 0.221* 0.328 0.398 0.579 0.328 0.146 0.257 0.085 0.084
Inpatient institution (reference group = town level)
County level 0.080 0.111 0.519 0.537 0.155 0.222 0.038 0.038 0.006 0.008
County above 0.487** 0.365 0.183 0.213 0.334 0.290 0.038 0.183 0.013 0.053
Self-assessed health (reference group = worse)
Normal −0.047 −0.035 0.305 0.324 −0.053 −0.042 −0.178 −0.040 0.009 0.002
Better −0.089 −0.062 0.305 0.380 −0.102 −0.088 0.156 −0.089 −0.016 0.008
*Statistically significant (P <0.05), **Highly statistically significant (P <0.01)
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institution level, the lower the reimbursement rates. An-
other possible explanation is that the poor are more cau-
tious than their rich counterparts in health spending in
order to avoid CHEs, or the poor may simply not be able
to pay for the upfront medical bills that are likely to in-
duce CHEs due to the reimbursement procedure that
the patients should pay all their medical bills before leav-
ing hospital. This inequality was reduced in 2012.
Our results indicate that household size and
hospitalisation-related variables such as real reimburse-
ment, length of stay, and inpatient institutions tended to
increase inequality in CHEs. Economic status caused
higher CHEs among the poor. One other study also
found that household income was inversely associated
with poverty caused by health expenditures [24]. The
changes in inequality between 2009 and 2012 show a
trend that fewer rich people having CHEs in 2012 com-
pared with 2009. It appears that the new health care re-
form had no effect on reducing the economic burden
among the poor, but this study found that this attributed
to the changes in economic status and household size
because their contributions to the changes in inequality
were positive. The negative contribution of reimburse-
ment to the change of inequality indicated that the poor
were less likely to incur CHEs than the rich after reim-
bursement from 2009 to 2012. This was the finding al-
though NCMS policies under the new health care
reform increased the reimbursement rate among the
poor, but the effect was still limited.
The policy implications from our results are four-fold.
First, healthcare reform policies in China that aim to re-
duce CHEs must continue to emphasise improving reim-
bursement, increasing subsidies, and containing healthcare
costs, especially inpatient costs. Second, the key to redu-
cing the incidence and inequality in catastrophic healthcare
expenditures in China lies in reducing poverty, decreasing
the gap between poor and rich, and continuing to improve
the Medical Aid system, which can play a key role in giving
Table 9 Oaxaca-type decomposition for changes in inequality, 2009–2012
2009–2012
ΔC*η Δη*C Total %
Economic status (reference group = Quintile1)
Quintile2 0.000 −0.007 −0.006 11.873
Quintile3 0.001 0.000 0.001 −1.077
Quintile4 0.001 −0.018 −0.017 32.354
Quintile5 0.000 −0.030 −0.030 56.800
Household member≥ 65 0.000 0.025 0.025 −48.308
Household member≤ 5 0.001 0.039 0.039 −75.207
Household head
Sex (male) 0.000 0.006 0.006 −10.883
Education level (reference group = below primary school level)
Junior middle school −0.003 0.011 0.008 −15.580
Senior middle school and above 0.008 −0.001 0.007 −14.162
Occupation (farmer) −0.001 0.004 0.003 −5.737
Household size (reference group = 1–3 members)
≥ 4 members −0.008 −0.045 −0.053 102.438
Real reimbursement 0.003 0.025 0.028 −54.644
Length of stay (reference group = fewer than 8 days)
8–14 days 0.016 −0.004 0.013 −24.662
≥ 15 days 0.036 −0.037 0.000 0.578
Inpatient institution (reference group = town level)
County level 0.000 0.003 0.003 −4.911
County above 0.042 −0.002 0.040 −77.572
Self-assessed health (reference group = worse)
Normal −0.006 −0.002 −0.008 14.912
Better 0.022 0.002 0.024 −45.662
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extra financial assistance to those who are the poor-
est. This is consistent with findings from other stud-
ies [42, 43]. Third, cost containment policies in China
should pay attention to length of hospital stay and
aim to reduce unnecessary hospitalisations while
maintaining quality of care. Fourth, proper incentives
and gatekeeping mechanisms should be implemented
to ensure that patients seek care at the appropriate
hospital levels. Overuse of county-level institutions
may lead to waste of resources.
Our study has a number of limitations. First, due to
the limitations in the survey data, we only analysed the
inpatient health expenditures for households that experi-
enced a hospitalisation in the previous year. This could
possibly underestimate the incidence of CHEs. Second,
our sample was limited to three representative counties
in Jinan city in the Shandong province, and thus was not
nationally representative. Thus, whether the conclusions
drawn from this study are applicable to the whole coun-
try is uncertain. Lastly, we used a uniform threshold in
defining CHEs, regardless of the household income level.
However, rich households may have a greater capacity to
pay and may be able to spend more on health care with-
out affecting their consumption of necessities. It is likely
more appropriate to use a higher threshold for rich
households when defining CHEs. Future research should
attempt to overcome these limitations and seek nation-
ally representative data to evaluate the evolution of the
impacts of the NCMS.
Conclusions
Our study found that the impact of the NCMS on alleviat-
ing the financial burden of rural residents was still limited
and there were inequalities in the CHEs. The rich were
more likely to incur CHEs than were the poor after reim-
bursement. This inequality decreased in 2012, indicating
that the change in NCMS policies might have reduced the
difference in care-seeking behaviour between the rich and
poor. With the decomposition of the CI, our study indi-
cated that household size and hospitalisation-related vari-
ables tended to increase inequalities in CHEs. The Oaxaca
decomposition analysis, based on the decomposition of
the CI, suggested that the changes in inequality between
2009 and 2012 show a trend that the fewer rich people
having CHEs in 2012 compared with 2009, and this attrib-
uted to the changes in economic status and household
size rather than reimbursement levels. Policies should still
emphasise improving reimbursement and socioeconomic
status and reducing unnecessary hospitalisation, by redu-
cing poverty and the gap between poor and rich; continu-
ing to improve the Medical Aid system; maintaining
quality of care; and establishing proper incentive and gate-
keeping mechanisms.
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